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Radical politics today, the politics of emancipation (as opposed to revolution), is divided 
on  the  topic  of  the  ethics  of  emancipation  and  the  ‘character’  of  the  emancipatory 
subject –  that  is,  the  subject(s)  who  will  organize  the  Left  against  the  oppressive 
regime(s)  of  power.   Contemporary  debates  on  the  topic  of  emancipatory  politics 
propose  that  the  emancipatory  subject  displaces  the  Marxist  subject  of  historical 
materialism (the  proletariat)2 and, in the wake of  post-politics  – the shift  from global 
ideological  conflicts,  i.e.  the  Cold  War  conflict  between  capitalism and  communism, 
liberal  democracy  and  utopia,  to  “the  collaboration  of  enlightened  technocrats 
(economists, public opinion specialists…) and liberal multiculturalists” (Žižek 1999:  198) 
– radical politics now avoids the utopian idealism of traditional leftist politics.  Instead, 
radical  politics  centres  on the  mantra:   “society  does  not  exist”.   Utopia  is  deemed 
impossible, but its necessity has not been completely dismissed.
The point emphasized in radical politics is that it is impossible to have a fully 
realized, totally enclosed society (see Laclau and Mouffe 2001).  In other words, the idea 
1
of ‘society’ is somewhat akin to the idea of utopia.  Society as a fully closed system, 
according  to  Laclau  and  Mouffe,  is  impossible.   ‘Non-society’,  rather,  is  organized 
around a non-resolvable antagonism, however; the appearance of a fully closed society 
is produced by way of some kind of ideological  fantasy,  on the one hand, or by the 
temporary  hegemonic  content  of  mass  mobilizations  of  political  actors  against 
oppressive  regimes  of  power,  on  the  other.   Fantasy  creates  the  illusion  of 
completeness:   the  possibility  of  reconciliation  between  some mythical  origin  and  a 
future utopian ideal;  it  is an ideal which is  captured by the notion of  ‘emancipation’. 
Emancipatory politics, therefore, exposes the fantasy, makes it transparent, and restores 
antagonism as a central ordering principle:  it represents the impossible completeness of 
society.3  But the question remains:  is it possible to transcend (or traverse) the fantasy? 
Is emancipation possible?
Debate  continues  to  haunt  the  theoretical  analysis  of  radical  emancipatory 
politics  against  the  dominant,  oppressive  regimes  of  power.   In  this  debate,  two 
contemporary  theorists,  Ernesto  Laclau  and  Slavoj  Žižek,  have  formulated  opposed 
positions on the character of the emancipatory subject and the ethics of emancipation. 
Within their debate on emancipatory politics, Laclau and Žižek have produced a highly 
advanced matrix for the critique of ideology, based on a critical mélange of post-Marxist 
theory and Lacanian psychoanalysis.  
The opposition between Laclau and Žižek can be seen as one of  the central 
theoretical  conflicts  around  which  leftist  politics  are  organized  today.   Laclau  (with 
Chantal Mouffe), on the one hand, argues for a radical democratic politics sutured by his 
version  of  hegemony  and  populism.   For  him,  the  emancipatory  subject  can  be 
represented by the populism of the lumpenproletariat, or the “absolute ‘outsider’” (Laclau 
2005:  144).  According to Laclau, against Marx who conceived the “‘inside’ of history… 
as  a  history  of  production,”  the  expulsion  of  the  lumpenproletariat from the  field  of 
historicity  “is  the  very  condition  of  possibility  of  a  pure  interiority,  of  a  history  with 
coherent structure” (Ibid).  He argues that “any kind of underdog, even in the extreme 
and purely hypothetical  case in which it is exclusively a class defined by its location 
within  the  relations  of  production,  has  to  have  something  of  the  nature  of  the 
lumpenproletariat if it is going to be an antagonistic subject” (Ibid:  152).  For Žižek, on 
the other  hand,  class struggle  remains the central  overdetermining factor  of  political 
struggle,  or  political  antagonism (to  use Laclau’s  terms).   In  contrast  to  Laclau,  the 
emancipatory subject  par  excellence for  Žižek  is,  in  fact,  the  proletariat –  that  is,  a 
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nongroup within the “social edifice” itself (Žižek 2006a:  565).
The  proletariat exists  as  a  contradictory  group,  which  is  both  included  and 
excluded from society.  It  is included in the sense that it is required “in order for the 
dominant to reproduce themselves and their rule,” however; the proletariat is excluded in 
the sense that society “cannot find a proper place for them” (Žižek 2006a:  565).  The 
lumpenproletariat, in contrast, is denied any historicity, in Marxist theory, in the relations 
of production.  It is that group which is socially  and economically marginalized by the 
capitalist relations of production.  It is, as Žižek suggests, “a free-floating element that 
can  be  used  by  any  strata  or  class”  (Ibid).4 Therefore,  from  his  perspective,  the 
lumpenproletariat is that group that can be appropriated by either the populism of the 
oppressive regime or by the populism of ‘the people’, which is the (interim) name Laclau 
(2005) associates with his emancipatory actors.
Nevertheless, Laclau points out that Žižek’s logic suffers from the same kind of 
flaws found in Marx’s reasoning.  For Marx, the historical “actor” has to occupy a place 
within  the  relations  of  production.   However,  as  Laclau  points  out,  “this  location  is 
precisely what the lumpenproletariat does not have” (Laclau 2006:  667).  According to 
Laclau, Marx concludes – and this, for Laclau, is one of the inherent flaws in Marx’s 
reasoning – that “the lumpenproletariat should be denied any historicity” (Ibid).
Rather than seeing Laclau and Žižek’s approaches as completely antagonistic, 
we can, instead, locate their points of convergence and commensurability.  Despite their 
recent debates (see Butler, et al. 2000; Laclau 2006; Žižek 2006a, and; Žižek 2006b), it 
is possible to situate where they are consistent with each other in their theorizations of 
hegemony and ideology,  respectively.  This is considered in the following by reading 
each through the points of the other’s critique.  In doing so, we will locate places where 
each approach is consistent, or may be subsidized, with the claims of the other.  
The proceeding is an analysis of the debate between Laclau and Žižek on the 
topic of emancipation, but it is also a reading of their methodological approach to this 
study.  By analyzing their readings of emancipation, I argue that a ‘happy encounter’ of 
Laclau and Žižek can be produced for the purpose of conducting ideological critique. 
Laclau and Žižek share a unique understanding of ideology and hegemony.  It is only in 
the particular content of emancipation that they begin to diverge.  In assessing their 
positions  on  the  character  of  the  emancipatory  subject,  the  following  considers  the 
opposition between populism (which is Laclau’s ideal formation of emancipatory politics) 
and class struggle, Laclau and Žižek’s considerations on the universal and the particular 
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as  they  relate  to  the  form  and  content  of  emancipatory  struggles,  and  the  use  of 
Lacanian  psychoanalytic  theory  in  the  process  of  elaborating  on  political 
struggle/antagonism – something of which both Laclau and Žižek employ in order to 
make their respective cases.  Although they come to different conclusions regarding the 
ethics of emancipation and the character of the emancipatory subject(s),  the present 
analysis highlights the ways in which Laclau and Žižek have developed an appealing 
approach for the study of ideology.  This will become evident as we move backwards 
from the point of their split towards their points of convergence.  It will become clear that 
moving  backwards  is  exactly  the  approach  necessary  for  an  ideological  critique  of 
emancipation.
Populism and Class Struggle
In his book, On Populist Reason (2005), Laclau claims that the unity of a political group 
is “the result of an articulation of demands” (Laclau 2005:  ix).  However, according to 
him,  the  articulation  of  this  unity  does  not  necessarily  correspond  to  some  pre-
established, positive entity.  The multitude of groups with claims against the oppressive 
regime exists in a differential  relationship to each other.  They are divided by social, 
cultural,  economic  and  political  antagonisms.5  Since  demands  are  made  against 
institutions,  it  is,  rather,  a shared negativity which  unites the ‘the people’  –  Laclau’s 
emancipatory subjects – against an oppressive regime.  Despite their differences, what 
they share is a collective opposition to the dominant regime.  Populism, for Laclau, is, 
thus, “a way of constructing the political” (Ibid:  xi).  It is a category of political unity that 
is structured around antagonism:  the impossibility of a total, full or closed society (see 
Laclau and Mouffe 2001:  125).  What Laclau’s theory of populism proposes, then, is that 
the ‘naming’ of the emancipatory subject or group is  not something that precedes the 
emancipatory struggle.  For him, emancipatory politics should not be organized around 
any particular group or conflict.  Rather, the unity of the group is forged through a logic of 
articulation  of  equivalential  demands  (Laclau  2005:   x).   When the  various  political 
agents come together to articulate the same demands against the oppressive regime, a 
new political unity emerges.  For Laclau, the ‘naming’ of the group occurs simultaneously 
with the articulation of demands and not before.  
The  ‘people’  is  not  something  that  pre-exists;  it  is  that  which  is  discursively 
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constructed in the process of emancipatory struggle.  As Žižek puts it, for Laclau “the 
fact  that  some  particular  struggle  is  elevated  into  the  ‘universal  equivalent’  of  all 
struggles  is  not  a  predetermined  fact  but  itself  the  result  of  the  contingent  political 
struggle for hegemony” (Žižek 2006a:  554).  Žižek, in contrast, sees the emancipatory 
subject  or  group  as  something  that  does pre-exist  the  struggle  for  emancipation, 
however;  it  is  unknowable  since,  in  the  process  of  emancipatory  struggle,  it  lacks 
symbolic integration.  According to him, 
the  identity  of  an  object  in  all  counterfactual  situations  –  through  the 
change of all its descriptive features – is the retroactive effect of naming 
itself:  it is the name itself, the signifier, which supports the identity of the 
object.  That ‘surplus’ in the object which stays the same in all possible 
worlds is ‘something in it  more than itself’,  that is to say the Lacanian 
objet petit a:  we search in vain for it in positive reality because it has no 
positive consistency – because it is just an objectification of a void, of a 
discontinuity opened in reality by the emergence of the signifier.  (Žižek 
1989:  94-95)6
As Laclau suggests, Žižek’s theory is that, if the object (or the signifier of the group) 
“remains  the  same beyond  all  its  descriptive  changes… the  ‘X’  [the  object  resisting 
symbolic  integration]  is  a  retroactive  effect  of  naming”  (Laclau  2005:   102).   The 
emancipatory  subject  is,  thus,  for  Žižek,  a  product  of  its  relation  to  an ‘indivisible 
remainder’:  the objet a or master signifier.  It is that which persists beyond all attempts 
at its diffusion through symbolic integration.
According to Žižek, this signifier which resists symbolic integration is represented 
by the Lacanian objet a – the master signifier, or the quilting point (point de caption, or, 
as it is theorized by Laclau and Mouffe, a ‘nodal point’).  The name of this signifier, as 
Laclau points out, “brings about the unity of a discursive formation” but it “has no positive 
identity of its own” (Laclau 2005:  103).  However, what Žižek, in fact, proposes is that 
this  remainder,  this  signifier  resisting  symbolic  integration,  is  the  “overdetermining 
principle of articulation of the multitude of emancipatory struggles” (Žižek 2006b:  193). 
For him, the signifier for this overdetermining principle is class struggle.
The reason why Žižek proposes class struggle as the overdetermining principle 
of emancipatory struggle has to do with his understanding of exclusion.  According to 
Žižek, the political philosophy of liberal democracy claims to be neutral and impartial. 
However, he argues that neutrality is impossible, “there is no way to avoid being partial” 
(Žižek 2006c:  178).  Liberal democracy, as Žižek understands it, is a centrist political 
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philosophy  which  has  been  placed  in  between  the  right  and  the  left,  and  that  its 
proponents claim that both polar ends ultimately lead towards a “totalitarian threat to the 
rule  of  Law”  (Ibid).   In  contrast  to  this,  Žižek  argues  that,  in  fact,  each  of  the  two 
extremes follows a different logic.
On the one hand, Žižek suggests,  “the right  legitimizes its  suspension of  the 
Ethical  by  its  anti-universalist [emphasis  added]  stance,  by  way  of  reference  to  its 
particular  (religious,  patriotic)  identity  which  overrules  any  universal  moral  or  legal 
standards” (Žižek 2006c:  178).  On the other hand, “the Left legitimizes its suspension 
of the Ethical precisely by means of reference to the true universality to come [emphasis 
added]” (Ibid).  As Žižek has it, the leftist perspective accepts the “antagonistic character 
of society,” the truth that there is no neutrality, and still maintains its universalist position. 
This, he claims, “can only be conceived if the antagonism is inherent to universality itself, 
that is, if universality itself is split into the ‘false’ concrete universality that legitimizes the 
existing division of the Whole into functional parts and the impossible/Real demand of 
‘abstract’ universality” (Ibid).  The leftist project, thus, according to Žižek is “to question 
the concrete existing universal order on behalf of its symptom, of the part that, although 
inherent to the existing universal order [emphasis added], has no ‘proper place’ within it” 
(Ibid).   By way of  ‘identifying  with  the symptom’,  Žižek proposes that  leftist  struggle 
“asserts (and identifies with)  the point of inherent exception/exclusion,  the ‘abject’,  the 
concrete positive order,  as the only point of true universality, as the point which belies 
the  existing  concrete  universality”  (Žižek  2006c:   178-179).   Thus,  the  ‘concrete’ 
universality of leftist struggle – the abject subjects of the abstract universalism of the 
dominant  order  –  comes  about  in  relation  to  the  point  of  exclusion  of  the  abstract 
universality  of  the dominant  – of  that  which  is  excluded from what  is  claimed to be 
universal.  Read retroactively, as the remainder of symbolic integration, class struggle, 
for  Žižek, is the signifier of this antagonism.  It is the signifier that identifies with the 
symptom.
The opposition between Laclau and Žižek can, in part, be read as a dispute over 
the particular content of the exclusion to the claims of the dominant towards universal 
inclusion.  Both Laclau and Žižek (ultimately) agree that the onslaught of the enemy “is 
the precondition of any popular identity” (Laclau 2006:  648).  So a preliminary inquiry 
into both Laclau’s and Žižek’s approaches must ask:  what is our point of departure? 
What/who is the enemy?  Žižek claims that Laclau’s approach towards conceiving ‘the 
people’  as the emancipatory subject discursively  constructs the enemy as a positive 
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ontological entity (Žižek 2006a:  556).  Conceiving the place of the enemy is difficult 
since  it  is  split  between  being  a  positive  ontological  entity  (the  state,  multi-national 
corporations, the media) and the symbolic order as such:  the big Other.  People are, 
thus, made subjects in two ways:  as subjects of the dominant social-political order, and 
as subjects  of  the symbolic  order.   However,  both Laclau’s and Žižek’s  approaches 
necessarily assume that there exists some group that requires emancipation.  Thus, at 
its base, emancipatory politics assumes:  1) that there is an ‘enemy’ that claims to be 
inclusive but is, in fact, exclusive, and; 2) that there is some oppressed and/or exploited 
group that requires emancipation.  To this we can add that, for emancipatory politics, 
rather than fight for inclusion, there is a desire to abolish the reigning order itself:  to 
maintain the antagonism central to radical politics.7  It is, thus, important to question the 
element of antagonism in emancipatory politics.  Laclau’s analysis of emancipation is a 
good place to begin considering an ideological critique of emancipatory struggle and the 
structuring role of antagonism.  This is also a fine starting point for understanding the 
necessity of a ‘backwards’ reading of emancipation.
Emancipation
According to  Laclau,  emancipation is  organized around six  ‘dimensions’:   the 
dichotomic  dimension;  a  holistic  dimension;  the  transparency  dimension;  “the  pre-
existence of what has to be emancipated vis-à-vis the act of emancipation”; a dimension 
of ground, and; a rationalistic dimension (Laclau 1996:  1-2).  The dichotomic dimension 
represents the discontinuity between the “emancipatory moment” and the social order 
that precedes this moment, while the holistic dimension is related to that which proceeds 
or follows the moment of emancipation; the holistic dimension represents the effect of 
emancipation  on  the  rest  of  social  life.   Thus,  both  the  dichotomic  and  the  holistic 
dimensions relate to the sequential, before and after, aspects of emancipation, with the 
“emancipatory  moment”  representing  the  point  of  reference  (the  master-signifier)  to 
each.   However,  the  meaning  of  the  “emancipatory  moment”  is  relative  to  each 
dimension  since  social  life  is  supposedly  transformed  following  the  “emancipatory 
moment.”  Therefore, the meaning of that which preceded the “emancipatory moment” – 
the  ancien  regime  of  social  life  –  is  transformed  by  that  which  follows.   This  is 
problematic since, if the “emancipatory moment” were truly successful, it would erase 
the  circumstances  out  of  which  it  was  produced,  thus  transforming  the  grounds  for 
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emancipation.  As a result – and this is one of the basic claims of Laclau and Mouffe – 
antagonism is impossible to resolve.
Transparency,  as  it  is  discussed  by  Laclau,  can  be  viewed  as  somewhat 
analogous to the Hegelian Absolute:  it represents the eradication of alienation in all of 
its  forms  (religious,  political,  economic,  etc.);  it  is  that  which  occurs  when  there  is 
“absolute coincidence of human essence with itself and there is no room for any relation 
of  either  power  or  representation”  (Laclau  1996:   1).   In  a  sense,  the  element  of 
transparency represents the utopian ideal of emancipation.  We can already see that the 
dimension of transparency stands in as a necessary fiction.  This, for Laclau, represents 
that which, in Marxism, is the future communist utopia with the withering away of the 
state,  as  well  as  other  theories  regarding  the  ‘promise’  of  humanist,  or  naturalist 
reconciliation.  Emancipation, in this sense, would represent “the elimination of power, 
the  abolition  of  the  subject/object  distinction,  and  the  management  –  without  any 
opaqueness or mediation – of communitarian affairs by social agents identified with the 
viewpoint of social totality” (Laclau 1996:  1).  From Laclau’s position on the impossible 
completeness of society, we should consider the dimension of transparency as one that 
can never be realized.  The dimension of transparency in emancipatory politics is, thus, 
impossible.   This  being  the  case,  we  arrive  at  a  conundrum:   if  transparency  is 
impossible, what is the point of emancipatory politics?
For Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, radical and plural democracy assumes a limit to 
objectivity, which is what they refer to as antagonism (Laclau and Mouffe 2001:  122). 
Antagonism  represents  the  impossibility  of  a  fully  constituted  society  (Ibid:   125). 
However, they claim that “if society is not totally possible, neither is it totally impossible… 
if  society is never transparent  to itself  because it  is unable to constitute itself  as an 
objective field, neither is antagonism entirely transparent” (Ibid:  129).  Therefore, the 
dimension of transparency in Laclau’s analysis of emancipation represents the possibility 
and the impossibility of realizing the totality of society.  (As we will see, the ‘promise’ of 
transparency is related to Žižek’s notion of ideological fantasy).
The fourth dimension of Laclau’s analysis is the pre-existence of what has to be 
emancipated.  As he argues, “there is no emancipation without oppression, and there is 
no  oppression  without  the  presence  of  something  which  is  impeded  in  its  free 
development by oppressive forces” (Laclau 1996:  1).  From this, we can understand the 
dimension of transparency as something that is related to that which is being impeded, 
oppressed or exploited.  Transparency would allow for the free development of what was 
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previously inhibited by the oppressive forces.  Emancipation, according to Laclau, is the 
liberation “of something which precedes the liberating act” (Ibid).  Nevertheless, in his 
theorization of emancipation, this ‘something’ remains empty, without definition.  This is 
a strategic move for Laclau since, when speaking of liberation it is important not to fall 
into the trap of messianic eschatology.  If we follow the logic of the messianic we risk 
falling  into  the  trap  of  oppressive  abstract  universalism.   Therefore,  the  promise  of 
transparency, as we will see, is both a progressive and a retroactive conception.  It is 
progressive in the sense that its promise represents a goal towards which emancipation 
aims.  However, it is retroactive in the sense that the pre-existence of that which is to 
liberated  follows  from  the  existence  of  the  oppressive  forces.   In  other  words,  the 
oppressive force is the precondition of that which is to be liberated.  We can only locate 
exclusion and inhibition in relation to the abstract universalism of the dominant order. 
Furthermore, the subject-identity of those who require emancipation is interpellated by 
the  dominant  order.   Thus,  we  are  not  talking  about  liberating  and  reuniting  the 
subject/object relation; we are not talking about returning humanity to its primal species 
being,  or  some  kind  of  humanist  reconciliation  of  humanity  with  its  primal  state  of 
existence.  In assessing the opposition between oppressor and oppressed we come to 
understand that that which requires liberation and that which impedes liberation exist in 
an antagonistic, although contingent relationship.
From  a  strictly  humanist  perspective,  that  which  is  to  be  emancipated,  or 
liberated,  pre-exists  the  oppressive  force.   The  humanist  position  holds  that  the 
oppressed group  is  the  precondition  of  emancipation.   In  other  words,  this  position 
conceives of some primal state of existence as the precondition for emancipation, as if, 
before the presence of the oppressive force, people were truly free in nature.  In contrast 
to this, we should avoid the temptation to perceive some kind of human nature that is 
being inhibited by the oppressive forces.  Rather, we should discursively construct the 
identity of those who are excluded by the oppressive force.  However, against liberal 
centrism, which aims at a politics of inclusion, thus avoiding the inherent exclusion of the 
oppressive regime and masking the antagonism at its core, the radical solution is to 
completely  eradicate  the  forces  of  oppression.   The  discursive  construction  of  the 
excluded is, therefore, constructed retroactively.  What older theories perceive as the 
primal state of nature is, in fact, the symptom of the present conditions of oppression.
The dimension of ground follows logically from the assertion that the past is the 
symptom of the present conditions of oppression.  Therefore, it is also related to the first 
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two dimensions, the dichotomic and the holistic.  The dimension of ground represents 
the level of  the social on which the emancipatory moment,  ‘demand’ or ‘act’,  occurs. 
According to Laclau, a truly radical moment of emancipation can leave no traces behind 
of that which it followed.  Therefore, the act of emancipation has to transform the entire 
ground on which it is structured (Laclau 1996:  2).  Thus, every emancipatory moment,  
every emancipatory act, transforms the very co-ordinates of the antagonism.  In doing 
so, it retroactively recreates and renews the promise of transparency.  We can deduce 
from this that, with every act of liberation a new antagonism is produced, which equally 
produces a new ground for emancipation.
Laclau’s  final  dimension,  the rationalistic  dimension,  invokes a  relation to the 
Lacanian concept of the Real – the kernel around which the symbolic order is organized. 
According to Laclau, “full emancipation is simply the moment in which the real ceases to 
be  an  opaque  positivity  confronting  us,  and  in  which  the  latter’s  distance  from the 
rational  is  finally  cancelled”  (Laclau  1996:   2).   The  problem  with  rational,  secular 
eschatology, for Laclau, is that it “has to show the possibility of a universal actor who is 
beyond contradictions between particularity and universality” (Ibid:  11).  However, this 
political actor cannot exist without the pre-existence of some identity that represses her 
from fully developing, making the idea of emancipation meaningless (Ibid:  3).  This is 
one reason why, in Lacanian terms, the subject is always split; it is the subject of a lack 
(see,  for  example,  Lacan  1977:   203-215).   Thus,  according  to  Laclau,  “true 
emancipation requires a real ‘other’” (Laclau 1996:  3).
If the identity seeking emancipation, the emancipatory subject, precedes, then 
the Other is discursively constructed and is not a real Other.  If, instead, the oppressive 
Other  precedes  the  emancipatory  subject,  the  identity  of  the  subject  itself  must  be 
discursively  constructed  in  opposition  to  the  Other.   Essentially,  we  must  come  to 
recognize that  there is  a lack in both the subject  and the Other,  and that  neither is 
complete  or  universal.   Rather,  each  is  split  between  both  positive  and  negative 
contents:  that which it has and that which it lacks.  According to Laclau, “this constitutive 
split shows the emergence of the universal within the particular” (Laclau 1996:  14).  
Laclau’s  dimensions  of  emancipation  are  useful  in  pointing  towards  and 
assessing  some particularity  from which  the  universal  arises.   In  the  case  of  each 
dimension  of  emancipation,  its  meaning  ultimately  relates  back  to  the  moment 
emancipation itself.  It is this particularity which informs, retroactively, the meaning of the 
ground.  Laclau and Žižek break ways when it comes to the particular content and ethics 
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of emancipation, yet their approaches to the study of the particular overlap.  They both 
conceive the particular content of emancipation in relation to notions of hegemony and 
ideological struggle.
Universal  and  Particular,  or  the  Relation  between  Master  Signifier  and  Empty 
Signifier:  Ideology and Hegemony
Laclau emphasizes that, because of the split between the positive and negative 
contents of the subject and the Other, 
(1) the universal has no content of its own, but is an absent fullness or, 
rather, the signifier of fullness as such, of the very idea of fullness; (2) the 
universal  can only emerge out of  the particular,  because it  is only the 
negation of a particular content that transforms that content in the symbol 
of a universality transcending it; (3) since, however, the universal – taken 
by  itself  –  is  an  empty  signifier,  what particular  content  is  going  to 
symbolize the latter is something which cannot be determined either by 
an analysis of the particular in itself or of the universal.  (Laclau 1996:  15)
For Laclau, then, the universal is empty, it can only emerge through the negation of 
various other particulars, and the content of this particular standing in for the universal 
cannot be detected by an analysis of the particular itself.  In Marxism, however, there is 
a  name  for  this  effect  of  a  particular  content  standing  in  for  the  emptiness  of  the 
universal:  ideology; and, it is the relation of ideology to hegemony that accounts for its 
pervasiveness – it accounts for its standing in as the master-signifier of the universal and 
for the interpellation of subjectivity.
According to Žižek, “in the predominant Marxist perspective the ideological gaze 
is  a  partial gaze overlooking the  totality of  social  relations,  whereas in the Lacanian 
perspective ideology rather designates  a totality set on effacing the traces of its own 
impossibility” (Žižek 1989:  49).  In Marxism, ideology represents the universalization of 
a particular content, the particular standpoint of the bourgeoisie.  The primary ideological 
gesture, from a Marxist perspective, is, thus, to frame reality according to the particular 
perspective of the ruling class.  However, by invoking a Lacanian reading of ideology, 
Žižek argues that we should no longer speak of ideology simply as false-consciousness.
The  difference  between  the  Marxist  and  Lacanian  perspectives  on  ideology, 
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according to Žižek, corresponds to the difference between the Marxist  and Freudian 
notions of fetish:  “in Marxism a fetish conceals the positive network of social relations, 
whereas in Freud a fetish conceals the lack (‘castration’)  around which the symbolic 
network is articulated” (Žižek 1989:  49).  In Marxism, false-consciousness designates 
the veiling of the actually knowable relations of exploitation.  Here, the particular content 
of bourgeois ideology – the ideology of the ruling class – universalizes the claim against 
the oppressed (proletariat) class.  Marxist false-consciousness is therefore akin to the 
Marxist  concept  of  fetishism.   The commodity,  the  object,  reifies  the  positive  social 
relations of production,  concealing the processes of  exploitation.   A fetish for  Freud, 
however, stands in for something that, in a sense, never was:  the impossible ‘Thing’.
In  the  Lacanian  sense,  then,  the  phallus  signifies  the  symbolic  network  that 
conceals the lack of the real.  It is in this sense that Žižek argues that ideology is “a 
fantasy-construction which serves as a support for our ‘reality’ itself:  an ‘illusion’ which 
structures our effective,  real  social  relations and thereby masks some insupportable, 
real,  impossible  kernel”  (1989:   45).   Here,  Žižek  credits  Laclau  and  Mouffe  for 
conceiving the real as an antagonism – that is, “a traumatic social division which cannot 
be symbolized” (Ibid).  So, in contrast to the division between ideology (illusion; false-
consciousness) and reality, Žižek argues that ideology is, in fact, the support of reality. 
The ideological field is, therefore, structured around the lack of the real.  It is here that 
we  begin  to  understand  the  affinity  between  ideology  and  the  Lacanian  notions  of 
fantasy and objet a in Žižek’s argument.
The  Lacanian  objet  a –  the  object  cause  of  desire  –  represents  both  the 
impossible real object of desire (phallus) and that which temporarily stands in to hide this 
impossibility.  It is both that which stands in to mask the lack, and the empty signifier that 
is the lack itself.  It is, in fact, with the status and content of the Lacanian objet a that we 
begin to see the split between Laclau and Žižek.  For Laclau, the logic of hegemony and 
the logic of the Lacanian objet a overlap:  they both “refer to a fundamental ontological 
relation in which fullness can only be touched through a radical investment in a partial 
object – which is not a partiality  within the totality but a partiality which  is the totality” 
(Laclau 2006:  651).
As  Žižek  explains,  the  ‘ideological  field’  is  sustained,  as  Laclau  and  Mouffe 
argue,  by  ‘nodal  points’  (the  Lacanian  points  de  caption,  or  quilting  points),  which 
structure  the multitude of  ‘floating signifiers’  into  an apparently  unified totality  (Žižek 
1989:  87).  These nodal points fix the free-floating signifiers of meaning into a coherent 
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totalization,  into  an ideological  network of  understanding.   Thus,  according to Žižek, 
ideological struggle is the process of battling over which nodal points will come to fix the  
field of meaning (Ibid:  88).  Once fixed (and to be clear, this is a temporary fixing), the 
elements of the ideological field relate back to each other through the nodal point.  This 
nodal point, according to Žižek, is the Lacanian master-signifier: “the signifier for which 
all the others represent the subject” (Žižek 2002a:  21).  The objet a, then, according to 
Žižek, is thus the “real-impossible correlative” of the nodal points (Žižek 1989:  95).
As we have seen, Laclau equates the  objet a with hegemony (or at least,  he 
suggests that their logic overlaps).  For Žižek, the struggle for hegemony is related to the 
fixing of the master-signifier – “What is at stake in the ideological struggle is which of the 
‘nodal points’, points de caption, will totalize, include in its series of equivalences, these 
free floating elements” (Žižek 1989:  88); however, according to Laclau, the struggle for 
hegemony is, rather, related to an empty signifier:  “a signifier without signified” (Laclau 
1996:  36).  Thus, on the one hand, we are dealing with a particular signifier, which 
secretly overdetermines the field of signification (master-signifier),  while;  on the other 
hand,  we  have  an  empty,  universal  signifier  which  lacks  particular  content  (empty 
signifier).  Empty signifiers represent the limits to any signifying system and signify the 
impossible fullness of the system (Laclau 1996:  37).
In the relation between master and empty signifiers, it could be argued that the 
ideological field is never closed; it never achieves fullness or totality.  Both Laclau and 
Žižek  agree  that  fullness  is  unachievable  and,  as  Laclau  argues,  “it  is  only  a 
retrospective  illusion that  is  substituted by partial  objects  embodying that  impossible 
totality” (Laclau 2006:  651).  Hegemony, according to Laclau, is the process by which “a 
certain  particularity  assumes  the  representation  of  an  always  receding  universality” 
(Ibid).  In the struggle for hegemony, then, a particular/partial object comes to occupy the 
place of the impossible, universal fullness.  He suggests that the struggle for hegemony 
is the process by which “various political forces can compete in their efforts to present 
their particular objectives as those which carry out the filling of that lack” (Laclau 1996: 
44).  Nevertheless, Laclau contends “There is, certainly, an anchoring role played by 
certain privileged discursive elements – this is what the notion of  point de caption or 
‘Master-Signifier’ involves – but this anchoring function does not consist in an ultimate 
remainder  of  conceptual  substance  which  would  persist  through  all  processes  of 
discursive variation” (Laclau 2000:  70-71).  
In  other  words,  in  contrast  to  Žižek,  the  emancipatory  subject,  the  particular 
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struggle that represents the universal struggle against the oppressive regime is not, for 
Laclau, some indivisible remainder that pre-exists the emancipatory struggle.  However, 
as we will argue presently, the remainder of which Žižek brings to the surface must be 
read  in  relation  to  the  ‘promise’ of  transparency  that  we have discussed as  one  of 
Laclau’s  dimensions  of  emancipation.   It  is,  in  fact,  the  ideological  fantasy  of  
emancipation,  as  a  form of  reconciliation,  which  forms  the  basis  of  the  promise  of  
transparency.   The ‘promise’, however,  is produced retroactively,  as an anachronistic 
eschatology, which is part of the symptom of emancipatory struggle.  In other words, if 
we  begin with  emancipation as central  to  antagonism,  the chronology of  cause and 
symptom  must  be  reversed.   The  cause  (the  particular  master-signifier  –  the 
emancipatory struggle) is in the present and the symptom is constructed retroactively to 
recreate the dichotomic dimension.  The past is ontologically reconstructed with every 
new present.  How and why the symptom is read in this way is central to the reading of 
emancipatory struggle in both the work of Laclau and Žižek.  One begins with the desire 
for a particular object (emancipation) – an object which is central to hegemony – and, 
retroactively reconstructs the fantasy/illusion that structures her ideological reality.
Reading Time Backwards:  An Anachronistic Eschatology
The  project  of  emancipatory  struggle  has  as  its  aim  the  production  of 
transparency by radically transforming the ground.  However,  as we have seen, this 
becomes problematic  since,  by transforming the  ground,  the  dichotomic  and  holistic 
dimensions are, thereafter, also transformed, thus rendering the promise of transparency 
irrational.  In any emancipatory struggle, the pre-existence of the group that requires 
emancipation authenticates and authorizes the struggle itself.  As such, the enemy is 
constructed  as  something  that  alienates  subjects  from their  ‘true’  nature.   If  radical 
emancipatory politics are to maintain the central antagonism, and evade the problems of 
messianic  readings  of  emancipation,  it  is  necessary  to  abandon  a  forward-looking 
eschatology of the ‘promise’.  However, the ‘promise’ of emancipation is still a central 
structuring feature of emancipatory struggle.
Against the classical Marxist understanding of ideology, as Žižek argues, we are 
no longer dealing with a distinction between reality and false-consciousness.  Rather, we 
are dealing with ideology as the very foundation of our reality.  Ideology, he argues, “is 
not  a  dreamlike  illusion  that  we  build  to  escape  insupportable  reality;  in  its  basic 
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dimension it is a fantasy-construction which serves as a support for our ‘reality’ itself” 
(Žižek 1989:  45).  As a support of our reality, then, the ‘promise’ of future emancipation 
must logically correspond to the ‘fantasy-construction’, which is a support of reality, or 
‘ground’.   Thus,  not  only  does  the  ‘emancipatory  moment’  alter  the  ground,  it  also 
retroactively  transforms  the  very  fantasy-construction  that  supports  reality.   In  other 
words, as a symptom of emancipation, we do not arrive at transparency, instead a new 
fantasy is constructed:  a new fantasy of origins and emancipation.8
In  his  reading of  Derrida’s  Specters  of  Marx (1994),  Laclau asserts  that  “full 
reconciliation” (of  subject/object;  self/Other;  species being, etc.)  is impossible (Laclau 
1996:  69).  The promise of reconciliation, in other words, the promise of transparency, 
of society ever being complete, is not achievable.  What we are left with, then, is the 
‘structure  of  promise’  (Ibid:   74).   The  point,  according  to  Laclau,  is  to  imagine 
emancipation  without  the  messianic,  without  “a  pre-given  promised  land,  without 
determinate content” (Ibid).
In traditional Hegelian-Marxism, history is read as a dialectical process leading 
towards some promised end point:  the Absolute Idea or proletarian socialism, which will 
signal the ‘end of ideology’ or the ‘end of history’, or as Žižek points out, what Walter 
Benjamin referred to as the “Messianic moment”, which he defined as “dialectics at a 
standstill”  (Žižek 2002b:   7).   What Laclau proposes,  in a sense, is  to  maintain the 
‘structure  of  promise’  without  the  actual  content  of  the  promise.   Therefore,  the 
realization of emancipation is simply the re-construction of the messianic.  The promise 
of messianic time is the symptom of emancipation, read backwards.
Žižek  explains  that,  for  Lacan,  the  meaning  of  the  symptom  is  constructed 
retroactively.  It is constructed in the process of analysis, which produces its truth; the 
analysis  is  “the signifying frame which gives the symptoms their  symbolic  place and 
meaning”  (Žižek  1989:   56).   Every  moment  of  emancipation  thus  produces  a  new 
master-signifier and “changes retroactively the meaning of all tradition, restructures the 
narration of the past, makes it readable in another, new way” (Ibid).  It is only through the 
intervention of the emancipatory struggle that the past gains its meaning.  This is the 
reason why the objet a is both true and false:  it is true in the sense that the promise is 
the necessary object driving emancipatory struggle; it is false in the sense that it was 
always an impossible object.  The promise is the fantasy-construction that supports the 
reality of the struggle.  This is why Žižek relates ideology to the Lacanian formula for 
fantasy:  $<>a.  The split  subject produces its identity by way of the fantasy, as the 
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ideological  support  for  reality,  which  is  retroactively  constructed  in  relation  to  the 
particular content of the objet a, which, for Laclau, overlaps with the logic of hegemony.
Although Laclau and Žižek appear to share the logic of  messianic time, as a 
retroactive  reading  of  the  promise  –  of  the  messianic  –  which  ultimately  maintains 
antagonism, they differ on the character of the emancipatory subject – the subject(s) 
who is(are) responsible for emancipation – and on the ethics of emancipation.  This is 
because they differ on the content of the particular political hegemony of the Left, the 
particular  content  of  emancipation  and  antagonism,  on  the  master-signifier,  and 
therefore, on the grounds for emancipation.  Therefore,  each conceives of a different  
ethics of emancipation.  Because they differ on the particular content of emancipation 
they read emancipation  backwards  in  different  ways  and  find  different  symptoms of 
emancipation.   The  problem,  then,  is  not  with  the  structure  of  the  narrative  of 
emancipation, but with the characters and their modes of reconciliation.
Martians and Martian Value:  Act Vs. Demand
For Laclau, “the minimal unit in our social analysis is the category of demand” 
(Laclau 2006:  654).  Social analysis, according to Laclau, “presupposes that the social 
group… should be conceived as an articulation of heterogeneous demands” (Ibid).  All 
demands, according to Laclau, start as  requests and, when demands are not met by 
those in power, they become claims.  Thus, 
the frustration of an individual demand transforms the request into a claim 
as  far  as  people  see  themselves  as  bearers  of  rights  that  are  not 
recognized…  But  if  the  equivalence  between  claims is  extended… it 
becomes far more difficult to determine which is the instance to which the 
claims  are  addressed.   One  has  to  discursively  construct  the  enemy 
[emphasis added]… and, for the same reason, the identity of the claimers 
is transformed in this process of universalization of both the aims and the 
enemy…  Once we move beyond a certain point,  what  were requests 
within institutions become claims addressed to institutions, and at some 
stage  they  become  claims  against the  institutional  order.   When  this 
process has overflown the institutional apparatuses beyond a certain limit, 
we start having the people of populism.  (Laclau 2006:  655)
Thus,  for  Laclau,  demand – or  ‘social  demand’  – is  that  which  produces hegemony 
amongst  the  various  groups  with  claims  against  the  institutional  order.   ‘Demand’ 
constructs a ‘logic of equivalences’, which are measured against a master-signifier that 
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has never existed before.  It  is, ultimately, something new that fills in the lack of the 
empty  signifier.   ‘Demand’,  thus,  re-orders  the  coordinates  of  emancipation  and 
constructs  a  new  master-signifier  for  the  promise  of  emancipation.   By  conceiving 
‘demand’  as  the  minimal  unit  of  social  analysis,  Laclau  is  also  asserting  that  the 
emancipatory  subject  is  not  some  specific  group  that  pre-exists  the  emancipatory 
struggle, such as the proletariat.  ‘Demand’, instead, produces a populist coordination of 
those who are the ‘part of the no-part’:  the lumpenproletariat, or the absolute ‘outsider’ 
(Laclau 2005:  144).
Žižek, on the other hand, conceives of the ethics of emancipation through the 
‘act’.  This concept is somewhat problematic since an ‘act’ is never perceived by the 
subject  or  by  the  big  Other  (the  symbolic  order).   It  remains  outside  the  field  of 
acceptable actions and its meaning is only retroactively constructed.  As Žižek asserts, 
“one should assume that the revolutionary  act is not covered by the big Other” (Žižek 
2006c:  189).  This is one reason why Laclau accuses Žižek of “waiting for the Martians” 
(Laclau 2005:  232).  According to Laclau, it is impossible for Žižek’s ideal political actor 
– the proletariat – to effectively produce the universality to come that it promises since, 
like the Martians, we are never sure if it truly exists.  
However,  one reason why Žižek prefers  ‘act’  to  ‘demand’  has to  do with  his 
understanding of the Leninist notion of Augenblick:  “the unique chance of a revolution” 
(Žižek 2006c:   188).   He equates Laclau’s approach with  what  Lenin referred to as 
‘opportunism’.   Essentially,  his  argument  is  that  “those  who  wait  for  the  objective 
conditions of revolution to arrive will wait forever” (Ibid:  189).  According to Žižek, then, 
Laclau’s thesis is “that since Martians are impossible but necessary, in the process of 
hegemony an empirical social element is invested with Martian value.”  Therefore, Žižek 
asserts, “the difference between us must be that I (supposedly) believe in real Martians, 
while he knows that the place of Martians is forever empty” (Ibid:  191).  The element of 
hegemony  in  Laclau’s  populism  is  always  vacant,  waiting  to  be  occupied  by  some 
lacking value.  For Žižek, the value is already present in class struggle.
Class struggle, for Žižek, 
functions as a device that enables us (1) to account for the very changes 
in focus of emancipatory struggle (in my [Žižek’s] view, the very shift from 
the  central  role  of  the  classic  working-class  economic  struggle  to  an 
identity politics of recognition should be explained through the dynamics 
of  class  struggle)  and  (2)  to  analyze  and  judge  the  concrete  political 
content and stakes of different struggles.  (Žižek 2006b:  193-194)
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As  the  master-signifier  of  emancipatory  struggle,  class  struggle  is,  thus,  the 
overdetermining principle and not the actual content (Žižek 2006b:  193) against which 
the various other struggles are measured, recognized and evaluated:  the ‘indivisible 
remainder’ against which identity is discursively constructed.
In contrast to Laclau’s ‘demand, an ‘act’, according to Žižek, “redefines the very 
contours  of  what  is  possible  (an  act  accomplishes  what,  within  the  given  symbolic 
universe,  appears  to  be ‘impossible’,  yet  it  changes its  conditions  so  that  it  creates 
retroactively the conditions of its own possibility)” (Žižek 2000:  121).  An act changes 
“the very terrain that made it unacceptable” (Žižek 2000:  122) and “transforms the very 
coordinates of the disavowed phantasmatic foundation of our being” (Žižek 2000:  124). 
Žižek’s  assertion  that  class  struggle  is  the  principle  overdetermining  element  of 
emancipatory struggle thus serves a strategic function of legitimizing the ‘act’.  An ‘act’ is 
given legitimacy – it is transformed into the master signifier – by repositioning the ground 
on which it is authorized.
On the one hand, an ‘act’ is problematic since we can never know ahead of time 
what it will look like.  However, on the other hand, the problem with Laclau’s account of 
‘demand’ is that, if it starts off as a claim that individuals are “bearers of rights [emphasis 
added]  that  are  not  recognized”  (Laclau  2006:   655),  we  move  from  a  politics  of 
exclusion to a politics of inclusion, which ultimately legitimizes the ideological fantasy of 
the dominant symbolic order.  ‘Demand’ assumes that the dominant institutional order is 
capable  of  satisfying  the  claims  of  the  ‘people’  by  including  them  in  its  matrix  of 
recognition.  If the ‘rights’ that are being sought are already assumed by the big Other, 
the symbolic order, then ‘demand’ does not preserve the element of antagonism.  What 
should be aimed towards is, not the elimination of exclusion by way of inclusion, but a 
transformation of the ground that maintains the antagonism.  So, in the end, we are 
faced with  a dilemma:  is  it  more effective to  work towards emancipation within  the 
symbolic  network  or  must  we  rely  on  individual  ‘acts’  that  are  always  outside  the 
symbolic network?  If we follow the logic of the former there is the difficulty of evading 
the dominant order while  simultaneously working within its  very matrix,  however;  the 
latter solution leaves us without any concrete, knowable resolution.
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Conclusion
Although the opposition between Laclau and Žižek on the topic of emancipatory 
politics still leaves us without a concrete answer to the question of popular mobilization 
on the Left, their approach still provides us with a renewed methodology for undertaking 
ideological  critique.   While  Laclau  presents  us  with  the  social  elements  requiring 
transformation – essentially, the meaning and implications of emancipation – Žižek, with 
reference to Laclau and Mouffe, provides us with a Lacanian reading of ideology that 
avoids the messianic promise of  Hegelian-Marxism.  What we can discern from this 
model is that appeals to naturalism – or a mythical primacy of alienation (either as the 
divide  between  subject  and  object,  in  the  Hegelian-Marxist  sense,  or  as  the  split 
between subject and the Other, in the Lacanian sense) – are the necessary, although 
illusory, requirements of any ideological field.  Ideology, and not ‘demand,’ however, is 
still our “minimal unit of social analysis”, the study of which has been renewed by the 
coordinates  of  Laclau  and  Žižek’s  investigation  of  emancipatory  politics.   Laclau’s 
concept of ‘demand’, conversely, cannot be our minimal unit of analysis since it is still 
accounted  for  by  the  ideological  field,  by  the  symbolic  order.   In  other  words,  the 
dominant order already conditions the grounds upon which appeals against it are made. 
It sets the stage for what it is said to inhibit. 
Any reading of emancipatory politics must therefore be conducted against the 
context of the symbolic order structuring reality and the fantasy-construction on which it 
is  based.   Claims  against  the  dominant  order  must  be  viewed  as  relative  to  the 
hegemony of the dominant order, which secretly accounts for these claims.  If anything, 
the  relation  of  master-signifier  to  the  objet  a,  and  the  fantasy-construction  ($<>a), 
highlights the function of ideology in emancipatory politics.  For example, with regards to 
Marx’s conception of species being – that it is human nature to create and be productive 
–  we  see  the  same  ‘natural’  appeal  to  freedom  present  in  the  utopian  ideal  of 
communism as that which is present in liberal capitalism:  the withering away of the state 
(and here we are faced with the opposition between state of nature/state of culture – the 
dichotomic  and  holistic  dimensions  of  emancipation  as  they  are  perceived  by  the 
dominant order).
As Žižek argues, ideology only really takes hold “when even the facts which at 
first sight contradict it  start  to function as arguments in its favour” (Žižek 1989:  49). 
Appeals to any state of nature that is inhibited by the oppressive regime, therefore, runs 
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the risk of essentializing, the grounds of exclusion and inclusion.  The point of the ‘act’, 
and emancipatory politics in general,  is,  thus,  not to essentialize that which is being 
inhibited, but to recreate utopia as something that is impossible but necessary.
Notes:
1 Many  thanks  to  Prof.  Colin  Mooers  for  his  time  and  assistance  in  preparing  this 
manuscript.
2  On  this  subject,  Ernesto  Laclau  asserts  that,  in  Marxism  “the  condition  for  the 
proletariat to be the agent of a global emancipation was that it had no particular interests 
to defend, because it had become the expression of pure human essence…  Today, on 
the  contrary,  we  tend  to  speak  of  emancipations (in  the  plural),  which  start  from a 
diversity  of  social  demands,  and  to  identify  democratic  practice  with  the  negotiated 
consensus among a plurality of social actors” (Butler et al. 2000:  7-8).  Chantal Mouffe, 
likewise, argues, “we have to break with rationalism, individualism, and universalism [of 
either liberal democracy or class struggle].  Only on that condition will it be possible to 
apprehend the multiplicity of forms of subordination that exist in social relations and to 
provide a framework for the articulation of the different democratic struggles – around 
gender, race, class, sexuality, environment and others” (Mouffe 1993:  7).
3 While radical politics avoids claims towards origins (such as Marx’s species being) and 
utopian  eschatology  (such  as  the  Hegelian  Absolute  or  proletarian  socialism), 
antagonism still seems to support an unsupportable essence:  différence for Derrida, or 
the split/barred subject for Lacan.
4 This is, in fact, how Marx perceived the lumpenproletariat:  In The Eighteenth Brumaire 
of  Louis  Bonaparte,  he  discusses  how the  bourgeoisie  had  on its  side  “the  finance 
aristocracy, the industrial bourgeoisie, the middle class, the petty bourgeois, the army, 
the lumpenproletariat [emphasis added] organised as the Mobile Guard, the intellectuals, 
the clergy and the rural population” against the June insurrection.  “On the side of the 
Paris proletariat,” Marx points out, “stood none but itself” (Marx 1994:  194).
5 In accordance with this, as Chantal Mouffe notes, “far from having produced a smooth 
transition to pluralist democracy, the collapse of Communism seems, in many places, to 
have  opened  the  way  to  a  resurgence  of  nationalism  and  the  emergence  of  new 
antagonisms.”   Rather  than  producing  a  chain  of  equivalences  between  various 
particular cultures and nationalisms, “we are witnessing an explosion of particularisms 
and an increasing challenge to Western [liberal democratic] universalism” (Mouffe 1993: 
1).  The point emphasized by Laclau and Mouffe is that society is impossible because 
the various positive aspects of particular identities exist in an antagonistic, differential 
relationship to each other.
6  To explain what this means for political struggle, Žižek provides the example of the 
Romanian overthrow of Ceausescu, in 1989, where the image of “the rebels waving the 
national flag with the red star, the Communist symbol, cut out, so that instead of the 
symbol standing for the organizing principle of national life, there was nothing but a hole 
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in its centre” represents a transitional phase, where the old master-signifier was losing 
hegemonic power, having not yet been replaced by a new one (Zizek 1993:  1).
7 According to Žižek, “When we are dealing with the today’s Left, we should always bear 
in mind the Leftist narcissism for the lost Cause, best characterized as the inversion of 
Talleyrand’s well known cynicism:  when, while at dinner, he overheard the sounds of a 
street  battle,  he commented to  his  companions  at  the table:   ‘You see,  our  side is 
winning!’  Asked ‘Which side?’, he answered:  ‘We’ll know tomorrow, when we find out 
who won!’  The Leftist nostalgic’s attitude is:  ‘You see, our side is losing!’  ‘Which side?’ 
‘We’ll know tomorrow, when we find out who lost!’” (Žižek 2002b:  53n).
8 To use one of Žižek’s examples from film, in The Matrix (1999), once Neo is pulled out 
of his ‘illusory’ reality, once he is emancipated, the fantasy-construction of his origins are 
radically altered, however;  he is presented with a new emancipatory struggle,  a new 
antagonism, against which his identity, his subjectivity is measured (see The Pervert’s  
Guide to Cinema (2006)).  The fantasy is not eradicated; its coordinates are simply re-
plotted.  He does not emerge from fantasy into reality.  Instead, he emerges from one 
fantasy-construction of reality into another.
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